Miracles Cont....

So we've done our main guy, Hume. Now to move onto the next 2 big ones - Richard Swinburne and Maurice Wiles.

Swinburne is a modern philosopher who argues for the possibility of miracles, plus criticises David Hume's approach and conclusions. Swinburne argues that the laws of nature are corrigible, and so miracles are perfectly plausible. If a law of nature is corrigible, it means it is statistical, or a probability, rather than a fixed certainty. This therefore gives scope for the laws to be broken, or rather be suspended, for God to be omnibenevolent. We can liken this to a parent setting guidelines for their child, but suspending them if the child is in pain, or pleads for help. Swinburne adds that miracles must be rare in order to drive humanity forward, as otherwise we may begin to expect such occurrences as cancer being miraculously cured, and stop researching into our own cures.

He sets out miracles as being possible by changing the definition of a law of nature, and also uses the Principles of Credulity and Testimony to show they are possible. The Principle of Credulity states 'if X seems to be so, X probably is so', and the Principle of Testimony argues we should accept as much testimony as possible, not rejecting it unless there is sufficient grounds to do so. He outlines a main and subsidiary argument;

Main Argument - the more evidence for the miracle, the more probable the miracle occurred (much like the Principle of Credulity)

Subsidiary Argument - (1) Principle of Testimony - avoid rejecting evidence unless it is clearly invalid
(2) determine the reliability of the evidence you are given (i.e. is it from a doctor talking about a medical hearing, or someone who witnessed the healing)
(3) look for consistency within the witness accounts

If we follow this, we are giving rise to the possibility of miracles - Swinburne's aim. However he does not ever state that miracles do happen, rather that they may, and to determine whether or not they have we should follow these stages.

NB: He critiques Hume as he argues we should take as many witness accounts as possible, so it does not matter if someone is uneducated, their evidence may just be lower in value than someone who is highly educated. He also stated miracles do not cancel each other out, and we cannot define 'ignorant and barbarous'.

Swinburne also noted that there is evidence for miracles within physical signs, memories, and science. Science gives us evidence as it allows us to know what is possible and what is not, so we can see if it is a miraculous occurrence. But Swinburne has problems too - he argued we cannot define ignorant and barbarous, so equally we can ask how do we define someone as untrustworthy enough to reject their evidence? Moreover, testimony is very subjective, so it can be hard to establish truths from it, and we can ask how much evidence is needed to 'prove' something is a miracle?

The last problem with Swinburne, that of the problem of evil, leads nicely into Wiles' rejection of miracles. The Problem of Evil asks how can God be omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and allow evil in this world? By Swinburne arguing for miracles he compromises God's omnibenevolence, as how can God be all loving if he gives miracles to some and not others? Why should some be saved when others die in natural disasters and of diseases, but receive no miracle? This led Wiles to propound the moral rejection of miracles.

Wiles argues that for God to be omnibenevolent he cannot complete miracles, as this would make him arbitrary (choosing people at random) and partisan (choosing some over others). If God truly loved everyone he could not allow some people to receive miracles while others suffer, and pray for miracles for themselves. So Wiles argues the only miracle is creation - God cannot intervene in our lives. This is extremely controversial however, and caused him to be removed from his post as Bishop. This is because without miracles Jesus would not have been resurrected - the central pillar of Christianity has been removed. Wiles is therefore not an acceptable option for believers to follow, as he reduces Christianity to prayer alone. Furthermore while he has allowed God's omnibenevolence to remain intact, God cannot be omnipotent if he cannot complete miracles, so it seems he has not solved the Problem of Evil.

Wiles added that the impact of the 'miracle' is the most important thing. For example there have been over 8,000 apparent healings/miracles at Lourdes, a Catholic Pilgrimage location, but less than 1% (67) have been verified. But this should not detract from the meaning of the miracle. If someone believes they have experienced a miracle it will profoundly effect their life, and so has meaning - Tillich and Bultmann would agree with this - it is the meaning of the experience that matters, rather than certifying it as a miracle. We could also defend Wiles by saying it allows educated believers to uphold science and their religion, as miracle accounts can be rejected.

However I see no reason as to why miracles must be arbitrary and partisan, as Wiles argues. God is omniscient, and possesses greater knowledge than we can ever have. This means that miracles may not be arbitrary/partisan at all, it is just that we do not understand God's greater plan - God should not have to conform to our reason, as he is a higher, more intelligent being. It may seem unfair to us, but we do not have the same level of knowledge as him.

So we have now covered the big 3 on miracles, but here are a few more definitions, and what their impact has on the possibility of miracles...

(1) John Hick - Laws of Nature are continually expanding, and cannot be broken. 'Miraculous' events are not miracles, they are simply new occurrences that should be included in these expanding laws.
This means that miracles cannot happen, and he can draw the same conclusion as Hume - they are not possible.

(2) Thomas Aquinas - there are 3 types of miracles...
(a) An event in which God does something nature could never do
(b) An event in which God does something nature could do, but not in the normal order
(c) An event in which God does something nature can do, but with the normal laws suspended
So Aquinas concludes that the laws of nature are not fixed, are breakable, and miracles have a divine origin.

(3) John Polkinghorne - the laws of nature are not fixed laws at all. Quantum mechanics is showing us that at a fundamental level randomness exists, and so miracles are not only possible, but probable.
So Polkinghorne has directly rejected Hume's argument, as the laws of nature do not exist - miracles are possible.

(4) St. Augustine - miracles are natural events that act within the laws of nature, we simply don't understand the laws fully. They are caused by God.
So Augustine argues from a different point of view from all of the above - miracles can occur, but there is no need to break the laws of nature - they can happen within them.

In conclusion, it seems the definition of a miracle you use can dramatically alter your conclusion - Aquinas, Augustine, Swinburne and Polkinghorne all argues for the possibility of miracles, and Hick, Hume and Wiles against, using fairly similar definitions (if they wish to reject miracles). So I cannot say whether or not miracles are possible as it all depends on my definition, which is entirely personal opinion, not hard fact.

Miracles - Definitions are everything

Exam time is looming, less than a week to go now! As OCR has never put a question on miracles on a June paper it seems likely the topic will come up, and so here is an overview of the topic. Miracles is a unique topic from all others as it all hinges on the definition a scholar uses - change the definition of a miracle, and they can become impossible before you even explain yourself. This makes these essays particularly challenging to write, as you must be very subtle with the way you explain things. Anyway, here we go....

Hume is your main guy for miracles - if he's not in  your essay, don't expect a good grade. His definition aims to set out that miracles cannot happen, and comes from a scientific, evidence based, and almost certainly atheist point of view (although in the 1700's he would be publicly discredited if a known atheist, so it is only implied within his work). He sets out a miracle to be a

"transgression of a law of nature brought about by a particular volition of a deity" Of Miracles I

By this Hume means (a) if  they happen, they do not have an earthly origin, and (b) to be classed as a miracle, the event must have broken some of the scientific laws we hold true, for example gravity, medically unexplainable healings, or any other empirically proven law. By saying this Hume has a priori rejected the chance of any miracles happening. This is because a law of nature, when he was writing, meant a fixed, unbreakable truth. The laws are laws - they cannot be broken. There are thousands of pieces of empirical evidence that show these laws are true. Objects always fall to the ground - never upwards or sideways, for example. Because of this he states that it is always more probable that the law was not broken, than this one piece of 'miracle' evidence should make us disregard the thousand of other pieces of evidence. Essentially, Hume states that for it to be a miracle, the evidence for this miracle should outweigh all other evidence that shows the law holds true. And because of this, it is always more likely that the miracle evidence is false, and miracle was nothing more than an odd occurrence. Hence Hume has a priori rejected the possibility of miracles. This is the main, and by far the strongest part of Hume's argument.

However there is a logical fallacy, the fallacy of induction, within Hume's argument. Arguing from induction is logically incorrect, as, in this case, arguing from empirical evidence as Hume does, we cannot include the possibility of new evidence coming forward. Yes we have empirical evidence for the laws of nature, but new evidence could change that law. Matthew Taylor's OCR textbook gives a good example to demonstrate this;

1. Living organisms are observed to need oxygen to survive

2. No living organisms has been observed not needing oxygen to survive

Conclusion - living organisms cannot survive without oxygen. But what about anaerobically respiring organisms? Hume, by arguing through induction, would have to ignore this new evidence, despite it going against the claim.

Furthermore Hume has jumped from saying miracles are improbable to rationally unacceptable - through his argument you cannot claim miracles cannot happen, yet he does. However we can defend Hume - proof by induction works infallibly in mathematics. We must remember though that mathematics deals with fixed, analytical subjects, rather than the subjective nature of a miracle event.

As previously mentioned, Hume has 4 other parts to his critique of miracles, all a posteriori -

(1) miracles tend to only happen to "ignorant and barbarous nations".

(2) miracle accounts from different religions cancel each other out. A Christian would claim a miracle involving the Virgin Mary proves their religion, and a Hindu can experience a different miracle and claim it has proven their religion too, so they cancel out.

(3) only uneducated people experience them, and people exaggerate stories as they circulate.

(4) people who support miracles have a natural tendency to suspend their reason and support the claim.

These are much, much weaker arguments however, easily criticised (so would be your best point of attack when writing an essay). William James' pluralist perspective argues all religions lead to the same path eventually, so miracles do not cancel each other out. Also most miracles involve healings, which do not aim to prove your particular God exists. To counter his 3rd and 4th arguments some miracles can leave physical evidence, which would prevent people from exaggerating claims/supporting unrealistic miracle ideas. And finally, against (1), how do you define ignorant and barbarous? Richard Swinburne uses his Principles of Credulity and Testimony to say unless you have very good reason (i.e. they are a known liar) you should not reject peoples evidence - so we should not simply say they are "ignorant and barbarous", then ignore their claim. 

So it seems while Hume's argument has survived 300 hundred years and is still prominently taught, there are some serious problems with it. But we can still defend Hume! Living in the 1700's means that Hume was fairly correct in what he was saying. Many people in society literally  were uneducated, and so he may be fair to say they would believe in things that may not be so. Also when he says uneducated it would be easy to define who he meant then, as the gap between rich and poor was obvious, in terms of education. Furthermore Steven Evans argues we have interpreted Hume wrongly. When he speaks of "laws of nature" Hume does not mean fixed, unbreakable truths, but probabilities. 

More on miracles in the next post.....

Meta Ethics Continued.....

As promised, the two non-cognitive meta ethical theories, and their discussion..........

I will start with the least controversial of the theories, prescriptivism, propounded by R.M. Hare. Note this is the only theory OCR ask about that has only one scholar attached to it. Prescriptivism relies upon Hare's previous 'Blik' theory concerning religious language. He defines a blik as a language group that your language has meaning within. There are many bliks within each persons life, and each one is unique - a phrase in one blik may have no meaning whatsoever in another.

e.g. I go to school, play hockey, have a family, and different friend groups. I can talk about my school work with my friends from school as they are in the same 'school' blik, so what I say will make sense to them and will have meaning. If I talk to my hockey friends about school it will not have any meaning however, as they are in a 'hockey' blik, and my school issues will not make any contextual sense to them, as they know nothing of my teachers, subjects, exams, etc.

So Hare also develops his ideas on meta ethics using this idea. He is attached to the non-cognitive 'camp', arguing ethical assertions are nothing more than your opinion. When we state "abortion is wrong" we are expressing what we believe about abortion, rather than an absolute moral fact about the issue. He furthered this by saying when we make ethical statements we are stating our preference of what should happen, and prescribing our opinion onto others (hence prescriptivism), much like Jesus' Golden Rule "do unto others as you would have them to do to you". Hare also added that these ethical opinions are deduced through reason, they are not 'known' intuitively as in non-naturalism.

By outlining this Hare comes across some major problems, provided by his own theory. His theory of bliks argues that language only makes sense within set groups, so how can you prescribe your moral opinion to all? Moreover to argue our opinion should be universalised (prescribed to all people) seems irrational - it is merely an opinion (even a reasoned one). Mackie would agree with this, arguing the universalisation of an opinion makes no rational sense.
There are also issues of moral culpability - if I prescribe to you that "stealing is moral", because that is my reasoned opinion, am I to blame when you go and steal a TV? However we must note that prescriptivism offers a much better non-cognitive alternative than A.J. Ayer's theory (below), and makes sense - we see our moral opinions as being correct over others who disagree.


A.J. Ayer propounded the last meta ethical theory, Emotivism, also known as the 'Boo! Hooray!' Theory. This is by far the most 'woolly' theory as it has no backing, and argues that morality is nothing more than your emotions and opinion, which leads to moral statements having no meaning in society (a very dangerous place to be). Ayer argues, due to his previous theory of Verificationism (a statement is only meaningful if it is analytical, ie. 1 + 1 = 2, or it is empirically verifiable, ie. "I have brown hair". If I look in a mirror I can verify that yes, I have brown hair), that moral statements contain no cognitive knowledge, so can be nothing more than your opinion on the matter. They have no real meaning - when you say "murder is wrong" you are actually simply expressing your feelings on the subject, much like going "murder....boo!", or "genetic engineering....hooray!" - hence 'Boo! Hooray!' theory.

Stevenson, a logical positivist (and a member of the Vienna Circle*) developed Ayer's ideas. He furthered them by saying that our ethical opinions inform other people about our belief systems, for example, if I say "abortion is wrong" we may deduce that I am a Catholic. I am not, hence 'may' is the important word - our ethical opinions only hint to our backgrounds, they do not define them. Stevenson also added that differences in opinion are brought about due to the different belief systems that we base our opinions on.

* The Vienna Circle was a group of philosophers and prominent thinkers in the early 19th Century who discussed what type of language is meaningful. If you were a member of the Circle, or followed their conclusions, you may be labelled as a logical positivist.

Emotivism has some serious problems. For one Ayer's theory of Verification has some problems of its own, and as this is what he bases emotivism on, we can critique it fairly well. Furthermore the theory concludes all ethical statements are meaningless opinion, so how do we function as a society? If I kill someone and argue it  was moral because I thought so, you cannot punish me as I just have a different opinion to you. This would make all court decisions mere opinion, rather than a fair, reasoned ruling. Moreover James Rachels argues that there is so much more to moral decision making than this - we use reason and emotion. Emotivism also denies the rational idea of deducing a moral opinion, and it also means we cannot distinguish between stealing and the Holocaust. If you follow emotivism they were both acts that went with some peoples moral opinions, and against others.

However despite this being a hugely impractical theory it does allow for cultural relativism, and explains well how differences of opinions arise. It also encourages tolerance of other peoples opinions, and thus of other peoples religious beliefs. We must be wary though that tolerance of beliefs does not become acceptance of horrific and immoral actions, such as the genocide in Rwanda in the 1990's, and other heinous acts.

In summary  meta ethics asks the deeper questions that go beyond right and wrong, postulating what we mean when we say something is moral. All meta-ethical theories will be far less practical than a normative theory as it does not tell you what to do, but arguably if we concluded ethical statements are opinion, all normative theories become useless.

 Each theory has its own merits; naturalism is practical and based on empirical evidence, something an enlightened society such as us craves. Non-naturalism feels right to us - few would deny they have an innate sense of what is right or wrong. Prescriptivism argues we should universalise our opinion, which again feels right - we are not normally happy accepting that someone else just disagrees with us that rape is wrong. And finally emotivism encourages tolerance and cultural relativism, something the world needs. Equally however they all have quite a few flaws, some of them fatal. So whilst this branch of ethics is needed to underpin normative theories, we cannot conclusively say that any of the 4 theories is the correct one, and so we still cannot state once and for all whether an ethical statement is a fact or opinion.

Meta Ethics

Meta ethics acts as the main alternative for normative ethics (practical theories that discern what is right/wrong), offering little practical advice, but postulating essential questions that have impact on normative ethics also. "meta", meaning beyond, is a branch of ethics concerning the language of morality, asking what we mean when we say something is 'right' or 'wrong' - is this our opinion, or is it fact? If an ethical statement is considered  to be a fact it may be called cognitive, if it is an opinion, non-cognitive.

NB: I made this post so as to do some extra revision for my A2 exam, so this is all relevant for anyone else studying the OCR A2 Level "ethics" paper. Some terms have not been fully explained as they are fairly low level, but any questions on what terms mean are welcome via comments :). Also I apologise for how long it is, I was trying to remember what the theories were but simultaneously practice critically writing on the theories.


There are 2 main theories that argue for the cognitive nature of ethical statements, naturalism and non-naturalism, aka intuitionism (shall be called non-naturalism from now on as this is much easier to spell!). Naturalism proposes that ethical statements are factual as you can base your statement on empirical evidence, something that is widely accepted, and asked for, in our enlightened society. It is this evidence that underpins your fact, and defines an action as right or wrong.

For example, the statement "murder is wrong" contains factual knowledge as evidence proves your assertion to be correct (a) the victim gave no consent to the ending of their life (b) the law will have been broken (when considering the UK, at least), (c) it will cause third parties such as family and friends harm; plus more reasons. It is this empirical evidence that defines an action as moral or immoral. Aristotelian thinking concurs with this idea, as a moral action achieves a moral consequence, much like Aristotle's final cause.

Further, there are 3 individual takes on naturalism:
          - Hedonic - Perry.
An action is moral if it is conducive to harmonising society. Very much similar to a utilitarian viewpoint, so also carries the same problem, that harmonising society means going with the majority's views, but these may not be moral views.

          - Social - Bradley
If we can understand our position in society then we can function morally. This has strong links to the ideas of Piaget and Kohlberg concerning conscience, where they argue from ages 5-10 (approximately) we have heteronomous morality, that depends on other people to know what is right and wrong. Once we reach full cognitive development, age 10, we have autonomous morality where we can deduce our own morals, and understand where these morals stand within the society we inhabit.

          - Theological - Aquinas
Gods will and scripture determine what is right and wrong, and you can develop your own specific moral codes through the use of the Primary Precepts (live in society, worship God, preservation of life, reproduction and educate the young). Naturally this theory has very strong links with Natural Law, Aquinas' theory, that outlines the 5 Primary Precepts. We must note thought that this branch of naturalism does rest upon the existence of God, something that has been far from proven.

Hence Naturalism allows us to establish cognitive facts about morality, and if we use Aquinas' thinking we can in fact develop specific morals, much like a normative ethical theory. This gives us strength behind what we say when we comment on ethical issues, as we are not postulating an opinion. Moreover the many types of naturalism make it attractive to both secular and religious people, and is the most practical meta-ethical theory.

G.E. Moore pointed out a crucial, a priori, logical fallacy within this argument however. Naturalism relies upon the fact that murder is wrong because it goes against the law. It lays out the premise "murder goes against the law", and so concludes "murder is wrong". This is what Moore dubbed the naturalistic fallacy, as this jumps from a fact to a value (not a logically coherent type of argument).
E.g. it is wrong to use the premise "I painted my nails this morning" to conclude "painting nails is wrong", yet this uses the same logic as naturalism - moving from a fact to a value.


This naturalistic fallacy promoted Moore to develop his own, competing, cognitive theory, non-naturalism. He argues "good is a non-definable property", meaning that it cannot be broken down further, much like the colour yellow. We all know (except the few with more rare forms of colour blindness) what yellow looks like, and can recognise it, but cannot explain it to anyone else (try it - not very easy at all!). 'Good' is like this too - a property in something we all have innate knowledge of, and can recognise, but cannot explain or break down. Hence we know by our intuition what is right or wrong, and as we all know this, our ethical statements are facts rather than opinion. However Moore has not accounted for when people are confused as to what to do, or whether something is right or wrong - if our intuition told us we would have clear defined  opinions on all ethical issues. Further people come to different decisions, which should not be possible if we all have the same innate knowledge of good.

This was developed further by W.D. Ross with his notion of Prima Facie duties. There are 7 duties that should all be adhered too, but some may need to take precedence over others in certain situations - our intuition tells us which. Our moral statements are used to justify our actions, and change others opinions. Prichard also developed Moore, arguing we cannot define "ought", instead we should use reason to collect facts about ethical dilemmas, and let intuition decide what the moral course of action is. They have both overcome the issue of different people reaching different decisions by arguing some are more morally enlightened than others, but neither scholars offers an explanation as to who these morally enlightened are. Thus they don't offer any more practical advice than Moore as we have no way of telling who is right and who is wrong about an ethical issue (synoptic link here to Falsification and R.M. Hare, who offers his own theory later on meta-ethics; Parable of the Lunatic and Dons. One sane group believes Dons are teachers and friendly, one sees them as trying to kill them, the insane group. Again gives no way of distinguishing who is right).

Ergo non-naturalism offers improvements on naturalism as it is a logically sound argument that 'feels right' - we would all argue there are certain things that we just 'know' are wrong. But we must remember that this becomes an issue if we live in a very multicultural society, where many opposing moral opinions are offered - we may not know which is right by our intuition alone.

So as to not make this too long the non-cognitive theories shall be outlined in the next post...........

Life After Death

As promised, the life after death essay as well.....

“Theories of Life after Death do not solve the difficulties raised by the Problem of Evil” Discuss.              

For believers the Problem of Evil has always been of great importance, and trouble, for their faith. The traditional Christian teaching entails the notion of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God who loves humanity now and forever more; yet evil exists in this world (note when speaking of evil in this essay, unless otherwise specified I will be referring to both natural and moral evil). This inconsistency with the nature of God, commonly known as the Inconsistent Triad, has caused a great deal of debate throughout Christianity and Theologians, and the extent of their success in solving this triad shall be critically assessed below.

Richard Dawkins seems an obscure choice to discuss when assessing a Christian theological problem, yet I feel his views should be expressed as he appears to be the only scholar who can conclusively ‘solve’ the inconsistent triad. Dawkins would argue strongly against the notion of life after death as he rejects any concept of a soul. The word ‘consciousness’ would fit far better with his ideas, as he states the traditional idea of a soul, as put forward by Descartes, Aquinas, Aristotle and so on entails nothing more than myth, made because science could not explain how we are conscious beings. This ‘soul 1’ as he calls it is nothing more than myth, a way of answering a question science cannot currently explain; “it’s not an explanation, it’s an evasion” Dawkins, the Guardian Debate. Rather we should believe, accept, that there is a ‘soul 2’ that is our genes. Although science has not yet provided an answer as to how we are conscious, genetics will soon do so, and thus there is no soul. This, along with Dawkins hard atheist views have ‘solved’ the problem of evil as if there is no soul, there can be no afterlife; death is the ultimate end of our consciousness. Furthermore if there is no God, there is no greater being to have logically incoherent qualities. Ergo the problem of evil has been solved as there is no problem; when we die that is the end of our lives, and there is no God, so we cannot debate whether or not he is truly omnipotent/omnibenevolent. However despite these hard views that seem on appearance to eradicate the problem of evil one must note that Dawkins has no proof whatsoever for his views – he appears to simply have replaced the myth of a soul with the myth of DNA.

A less extreme view that seems to solve the problem of evil is put forward by John Hick. Hick argued for the concept of life after death in the form of replicas, a logical thought experiment designed to show that a materialist afterlife is possible (he did not believe this however). His theodicy, in addition to replica theory, appears to solve the inconsistent triad as thus. Hick argues for belief in a God who, as in the book of Job, accepts responsibility for the evil in this world, and states that it was intentionally put there. He holds this belief as without evil there is no way that humans can have moral growth, or any moral behaviour. If there is no evil, there is no chance for humans to show compassion, empathy and help to those in need; he sees suffering as a necessary ‘soul-making’ step in life. Thus evil is a gift from God, put on earth to help humans. Keats would support this view, stating “do you not see how necessary the world of pains and troubles is to school the intelligence and make it a soul”. This, plus the idea of replica theory, which states upon the instant of our death our bodies are replicated with complete physical, memory and psychological continuity into a replica world, explains how evil can be in this world and God remain omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Humans need suffering to grow morally, and in the afterlife provided by replica theory our questions may be eschatologically verified, providing answers and explanation for the suffering we endured on earth. Ergo Hick seems very successful when dealing with the problem of evil.

Conversely however one must note that Hick has not accounted for the amount of evil present on this planet. If evil has to exist to allow soul-making, surely God could have allowed only moral evil (so that we may keep our freewill) and not allowed natural evil? This way suffering, and hence soul-making, can occur but the level of suffering is reduced. To argue something as horrific as genocide is necessary simply for soul-making seems extreme. Moreover replica theory alone has its own issues. Is the value of a copy, however good, really as high as the original human? Equally what happens if we die as an infant? If our body is replicated upon death, you will spend your life as a replica with an infant’s mind, so arguably cannot eschatologically verify why you suffered, and so cannot reach the state of understanding Hick describes (as explained in the book of Job). Therefore while Hick provides a better option than Dawkins to answer this question, as he does believe in a God and attempts to answer  the problem, there are issues with his approach that offer some significant boundaries to his conclusion.

Conversely Christian theories do not seem to solve the issues with the problem of evil. This clearly is not the conclusion believers would wish to draw but there are large inconsistencies within belief that must be noted. The first problem is encountered when looking at the nature of life after death. There is disagreement within Christiantiy as to whether when we are resurrected it is a physical or spiritual resurrection, as St Paul speaks of “glorified bodies” but this is an ambiguous term. Fundamentalist Christians would argue for a physical resurrection as in Matthew passages indicate physical suffering in hell; “and shall cast them into a furnace of fire; there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth” Matthew 13:42. However liberal ideas now argue for a spiritual resurrection, much like Aquinas’ ideas in which he stated hell is not a physical place, but eternal separation from God. However whichever of these views you follow Christianity does conclude that you go to either heaven or hell, and this justifies suffering on earth. If you have lead a good life your suffering will be forgotten as you will live eternally in the glory of heaven and never suffer again. Conversely if you have lead an immoral life you will be judged and thrown into hell, and the suffering you receive both in hell and on earth will have been justified by your immoral life. However despite solving one problem associated with the problem of evil, Christianity has simply raised even more problems. If we do not have freewill, as many would argue, due to the notion of predestination as put forward by John Calvin, then being judged on our actions is immoral. If we are predestined to go to heaven/hell, and therefore to do just/unjust actions in our life, God is not omnibenevolent, as he has no way to fairly judge us for actions we did not chose to commit. Furthermore can God be seen as omnibenevolent if he sends all people who are not Christians, but who have led good, moral lives, to hell? Hick would argue from a universalist point of view which may solve this issue, but universalism is not widely accepted in Christianity as of today. Hence while Christianity appears to solve the problem of evil through the existence of heaven and hell, it actually raises more issues than it solves, and cannot agree simply upon the nature of life after death, and therefore does not solve the issues raised by the problem of evil.

In light of the above theories of life after death do not solve the problem of evil. Christianity itself cannot solve the problem, despite it being of the upmost importance for their faith, and whilst Hick does come closer to answering the question, he equally cannot concretely solve the issues due to the high prevalence of evil on earth. Richard Dawkins provides the only argument that can concretely solve this theological issue, but this is only through eradicating the notion of a God, which is not something that believers are able to do. Ergo theories of life after death can solve some issues surrounding the problem of evil, but are all far away from solving it completely whilst maintaining belief in a God. 

Example Essays - OCR A Level

Its been a while! My final exams are only 3 and a half weeks away and as I revise best by handwriting notes and essays my blog has taken a backseat, but I thought today I would upload 2 of my essays as helpful guidance for other students, or as an introduction to the topic for anyone else.

The two I am uploading concern religious language, mainly the falsification principle, and life after death. My most previous post concerned the body-soul debate, and the life after death essay is a nice lead on to that. The life after death essay also has a nice theological slant, which tend to be the harder essay questions, so may be of particular use to fellow students on the course. Hope they are enjoyable reading and/or help!

NB for students: if these both obtained A* grades, either 32 or 33 out of 35. 

Falsification Principle Essay 

“The Falsification Principle fails to clearly demonstrate that religious language is meaningless” Discuss.                                                                                                                                              

The meaningfulness of religious language has been in great debate ever since the Logical Positivists proposed their views on verification, which promoted Flew, and Popper, to develop their ideas on falsification in the early 1950’s. Their ideas were debated intensely in a series of articles, known as the University Debate between Mitchell, Hare and Flew, and all seem to rest upon what your individual definition of ‘meaningful’ language is. The ideas put forward by believers, verificationists and falsificationists shall be critically assessed throughout this essay, focusing on definitions of meaningful language, and how this affects the successfulness of falsification.

Sir Karl Popper was dubbed ‘the original opposition’ of Verification as he believed that the only way science could progress was via the use of falsification rather than verification, otherwise we may begin to explain away anomalies in scientific theorems. These ideas were developed fully into the Falsification Principle by Anthony Flew, who stated that a meaningful statement is one that can be falsified. By this we mean you may be able to go out and prove the opposite of your assertion, for example “all swans are white”. This is a falsifiable statement as if you observe one black swan you have falsified your assertion. Conversely the assertion “it will rain somewhere, sometime” is unfalsifiable as you cannot find somewhere that never has, and never will, experience rain. Flew also noted that the more specific a statement, the more knowledge may be gained from it, as it is more probable the statement is wrong (falsifiable). These premises led Flew to conclude that religious language is meaningless, as religious believers will not accept evidence that may contradict their beliefs, hence they “die the death of a thousand qualifications” Anthony Flew, University Debate. He proposed that believers will continue to qualify their belief in the face of opposing evidence, reducing their beliefs to nothing, rather than accepting they may be wrong. An example of this is the assertion “God is good” when faced with the Biblical tale of Gods command to slaughter the Amalekites. A believer may respond by saying ‘this is all part of Gods loving plan but as humans we cannot understand this’ rather than accepting this as contradictory evidence and adjusting their belief accordingly.

Furthermore Flew used John Wisdoms Parable of the Gardener to support his views, although the parable was not intended for use in the falsification debate originally. The Parable entails two keen gardeners who come across a clearing in the jungle in which both flowers and weeds thrive. One gardener concludes it is a purely natural process whilst the other believes a gardener has been tending to it. They set traps and cameras in place to try and catch a gardener, but no matter how many traps fail one gardener believes it is a natural process, whilst the other maintains the clearing is tended to by an invisible, intangible gardener. It is the qualifications used by the latter gardener that Flew sees as “dying the death of a thousand qualifications” and reduce his belief to nothing meaningful. Thus through Flews premises it thus seems that falsification has been successful in demonstrating religious language as meaningless. Additionally Flews theory seems to have strengths over the Verification Principle as you may falsify something you cannot verify, overcoming Swinburne’s critique of verification. To verify the above example “all swans are white” you must observe all swans that have ever existed, whereas to falsify the assertion only one black swan need be located. Conversely it must be noted however that Swinburne’s criticism is still prominent for the falsification principle, using the analogy of the toys and cupboard. If we propose that when we are not looking all our toys come out of the cupboard and move, despite being unverifiable and unfalsifiable, the assertion has meaning. Additionally after Flew published his theory Mitchell and Hare responded, modifying the definition of meaningful language to what they saw as more appropriate.

Hare thought Flew had made an error when he treated religious language as assertions, as they are in fact life-changing expressions of belief. Hare spoke of Bliks, which are language groups you may speak meaningfully in (a little like Wittgenstein’s Language Game Theory) and they come in two forms; sane and insane. To demonstrate this he used the Parable of the Lunatic and the Dons, in which a student is convinced his professors are plotting to murder him. His friend sees this as insane, so procures the nicest, most humble don to the lunatic in order to convince him he is safe. The lunatic however sees the friendly don as a cunning ploy, so the dons may gain his trust. This continues, but the lunatic never accepts the dons are not trying to kill him. This parable demonstrates Hare’s point precisely; the lunatic is in the incorrect, insane blik, whilst his friend remains in the sane blik. Whichever blik you are in however will affect your life; the lunatic will clearly act differently around the University than his friend, due to his beliefs. It is the impact of these beliefs that give the language (and following his argument, religious language) meaning, despite being unfalsifiable. Vardy would support Hare, as he stated “religious language calls people out beyond the frontiers of their existing morality to a different way of living life”. By this Vardy is stating religion has a profound effect on the way people live their life, hence he may see religious language as meaningful as it is someone making a life-changing expression of belief that affects their life. Perhaps then this new, broader definition of meaningful is the one we should accept, and hence falsification has failed to conclusively state religious language is meaningless, as we should be using a different definition of meaningful language.

In response to Hare’s ideas however one must note that his view is by no means perfect; if there are sane and insane bliks that are both equally unverifiable and unfalsifiable, how are we to know which we are in? Both sets of beliefs will change our lives and the way we live them, but only one is right. It seems illogical to follow a blik that you can never know to be right. Furthermore Basil Mitchell would argue for another definition of meaningful language that goes against both Hare and Flew. Mitchell saw religious language as meaningful and that Flews premise was invalid as he had treated religious language as cognitive when it is not. Mitchell pointed out that whilst it does seem religious language is unfalsifiable and unverifiable this should not detract from its meaning. Moreover he argued that believers do accept there is evidence against their beliefs, but choose to place faith in their beliefs, which shall be revealed at the end of time. This view is similar to the eschatological verification of Hick. To demonstrate this concept Mitchell used the Parable of the Partisan and the Stranger. This parable entails a partisan who is met by a stranger claiming to be the leader of the resistance. The stranger tells the partisan he may sometimes help you and your fellow partisans, however sometimes he may be seen in the opposition’s uniform; throughout all this the stranger asks the partisan to trust him. Some of the partisan’s friends question the strangers claim when they see him helping the opposition, however the partisan remains strong in his belief. Mitchell saw belief as the crucial word in this parable; believers have reason behind their faith, like the Partisan, and note the evidence against their beliefs but choose to place faith in them. Religious language is indeed unfalsifiable but this does not mean it has no meaning to believers, according to Mitchell. This view contains similarities with Kierkegaard’s, who reasoned the ‘mysteries of Christianity’ cannot be explained by reason, or be falsified, but they do not need to be as they exist outside of reason. In this way they are paradoxical – one can believe, but cannot prove. Anti-realists may support this claim as they argue religious language is meaningful as it is coherent within religious groups. Ergo the falsification principle can be seen as very weak when concluding religious language is meaningless as believers, along with Mitchell, would see their values and beliefs as non-cognitive claims that affect their lives, and are therefore meaningful (rather than Flews definition of meaningful, that which is falsifiable). However whatever ones view on Mitchell one must note that this parable is weak when addressing the problem of evil and believers faith in God as the amount of reason behind the claim ‘God is loving’ is questionable. The prominence of both natural and moral evil in the world causes many people to see faith in a loving God completely illogical, hence Mitchells claims should be viewed with a critical eye.

In light of the arguments expressed the falsification principle does not clearly demonstrate religious language to be meaningless. The crux of the debate, as shown by the differing definitions of meaningful put forward by Mitchell and Hare, is what you regard as meaningful language. If you accept Flews premise that meaningful language is that which is falsifiable then he seems quite successful (excluding the minor objection from Swinburne); however if you accept the definitions of Hare and Mitchell falsification fails completely. These definitions are much more widely accepted in society and by believers throughout the world hence the falsification principle remains controversial and highly criticised, in my eyes. 

Introduction to the Body/Soul debate

The Philosophical Implications of Teletransportation 

(Introduction to the Body/Soul debate)

Today in class we discussed a thought experiment that intrigued me and shall thus be the subject of further discussion and entries as we move deeper into the topic. It concerns the (slightly unrealistic) concept of teletransportation, and the implications of this technology on our personhood (assuming that is the correct word in this context). I have chosen to use the word personhood carefully, despite it being mainly associated in the euthanasia and PVS debate in ethics as I think this represents the issue more concisely than any other alternative. The thought experiment:

Imagine you reside on earth in a time where teletransportation (teleportation) is possible. Obviously you wish to try this – who wouldn’t? It is convenient, suites most peoples tendencies to laziness perfectly, and is just cool. To understand the problems you must first understand how the technology would work (roughly). This type of technology can be analogised to sending an email via binary code. To send an email the file is not physically sent at immense speed to another computer across the globe. The message is coded into binary, and this binary is sent to the second computer, acting like a set of instructions. These instructions, the binary code, is then used by the second computer to ‘rebuild’ the electronic message, creating an identical copy in a separate location to where the original was sent. Teletransportation technology would work under the same principles. To transport me from my laptop in my lounge to Australia 3 things would be necessary;

(1)    A machine in my living room would need to be able to take out the code for ‘me’ – my genetic code (the binary)

(2)    The machine would need to be able to transmit this information to a second machine in Australia, which is capable of reading and interpreting this code

(3)    The second machine must then be able to ‘rebuild’ me, as the email was rebuilt, to make a full body with my memories, features and characteristics (the email)

Now imagine the first machine went wrong. I have been teletransported to my new location and am living in paradise. However ‘I’ still exist in the first machine, despite being disassembled and then reassembled in paradise – my body should have been destroyed in the first machine to prevent two ‘me’s’ existing at the same time. But could you kill the first ‘me’? I am a human with the same thoughts, feelings and body as the me in paradise. Who would be the real ‘me’?

This technology clearly poses huge consequences for ethical and philosophical debate, despite appearing on first appearance to be an obviously beneficial (and frankly incredible) piece of technology. If humans were able to teletransport themselves across the globe this would mean we are, in effect, agreeing to kill ourselves. By this I am referring to step 1 of the transportation process. The machine must take out the code for ‘me’ – all the information the second machine needs to rebuild me in the paradise of Australia. This would mean when ‘I’ arrive in Australia, the person left in England may be regarded as not really ‘me’. I am in Australia – I have all my memories, my body and my characteristics. So surely I am me, despite being disassembled and reassembled? But, as pointed out in the thought experiment, like an email, I still exist in snowy, cold England. So who is really me? If we accept the me in Australia is truly me, then we must kill the living, breathing human being in England. If we accept the me in England is really me, teletransportation as a technology is futile – we cannot use it ethically, as it involves the termination of human life inside the first machine. And the third option is there are two real, living ‘me’s’ who share memories, thoughts, past experiences, genetic codes and characteristics but exist on opposite sides of the globe. All three seem tricky standpoints to take.

It is this thought experiment that leads me to my true (more currently relevant) point. What makes me who I am? Descartes cogito ergo sum would appear to argue both are really me; both think like me, therefore both are me. Aquinas may argue the English me is the true me. He argued that self is mind and body, that to live you need both, but that the soul is the first principle of life. It cannot live without the body, but equally the body cannot live without the soul. In this way he may (and I argue this very tentatively) conclude the cold, snowed in ‘me’ is truly me as it has my soul. The soul is not contained within the genes, so was not coded for in the new, Australian me; thus English me is my true self. And so we reach the crux of the debate; what makes me me? Is it my soul, my body? Do I even have a soul? These are the issues that I shall cover in further entries, hoping to gain more insight and to understand past works in more detail so as to be able to make fewer rash claims. Read on soon.

Note: personhood was chosen as the word in the first paragraph as the thought experiments issue lies with the problem of what makes me me. Is it my body which contains my genes, or is it my soul, or perhaps both must be there for me to truly be me. Hence personhood seemed to be the correct word, as to choose who is the real me we must examine what defines me as me, the thinking human being I am.