Introduction to the Body/Soul debate

The Philosophical Implications of Teletransportation 

(Introduction to the Body/Soul debate)

Today in class we discussed a thought experiment that intrigued me and shall thus be the subject of further discussion and entries as we move deeper into the topic. It concerns the (slightly unrealistic) concept of teletransportation, and the implications of this technology on our personhood (assuming that is the correct word in this context). I have chosen to use the word personhood carefully, despite it being mainly associated in the euthanasia and PVS debate in ethics as I think this represents the issue more concisely than any other alternative. The thought experiment:

Imagine you reside on earth in a time where teletransportation (teleportation) is possible. Obviously you wish to try this – who wouldn’t? It is convenient, suites most peoples tendencies to laziness perfectly, and is just cool. To understand the problems you must first understand how the technology would work (roughly). This type of technology can be analogised to sending an email via binary code. To send an email the file is not physically sent at immense speed to another computer across the globe. The message is coded into binary, and this binary is sent to the second computer, acting like a set of instructions. These instructions, the binary code, is then used by the second computer to ‘rebuild’ the electronic message, creating an identical copy in a separate location to where the original was sent. Teletransportation technology would work under the same principles. To transport me from my laptop in my lounge to Australia 3 things would be necessary;

(1)    A machine in my living room would need to be able to take out the code for ‘me’ – my genetic code (the binary)

(2)    The machine would need to be able to transmit this information to a second machine in Australia, which is capable of reading and interpreting this code

(3)    The second machine must then be able to ‘rebuild’ me, as the email was rebuilt, to make a full body with my memories, features and characteristics (the email)

Now imagine the first machine went wrong. I have been teletransported to my new location and am living in paradise. However ‘I’ still exist in the first machine, despite being disassembled and then reassembled in paradise – my body should have been destroyed in the first machine to prevent two ‘me’s’ existing at the same time. But could you kill the first ‘me’? I am a human with the same thoughts, feelings and body as the me in paradise. Who would be the real ‘me’?

This technology clearly poses huge consequences for ethical and philosophical debate, despite appearing on first appearance to be an obviously beneficial (and frankly incredible) piece of technology. If humans were able to teletransport themselves across the globe this would mean we are, in effect, agreeing to kill ourselves. By this I am referring to step 1 of the transportation process. The machine must take out the code for ‘me’ – all the information the second machine needs to rebuild me in the paradise of Australia. This would mean when ‘I’ arrive in Australia, the person left in England may be regarded as not really ‘me’. I am in Australia – I have all my memories, my body and my characteristics. So surely I am me, despite being disassembled and reassembled? But, as pointed out in the thought experiment, like an email, I still exist in snowy, cold England. So who is really me? If we accept the me in Australia is truly me, then we must kill the living, breathing human being in England. If we accept the me in England is really me, teletransportation as a technology is futile – we cannot use it ethically, as it involves the termination of human life inside the first machine. And the third option is there are two real, living ‘me’s’ who share memories, thoughts, past experiences, genetic codes and characteristics but exist on opposite sides of the globe. All three seem tricky standpoints to take.

It is this thought experiment that leads me to my true (more currently relevant) point. What makes me who I am? Descartes cogito ergo sum would appear to argue both are really me; both think like me, therefore both are me. Aquinas may argue the English me is the true me. He argued that self is mind and body, that to live you need both, but that the soul is the first principle of life. It cannot live without the body, but equally the body cannot live without the soul. In this way he may (and I argue this very tentatively) conclude the cold, snowed in ‘me’ is truly me as it has my soul. The soul is not contained within the genes, so was not coded for in the new, Australian me; thus English me is my true self. And so we reach the crux of the debate; what makes me me? Is it my soul, my body? Do I even have a soul? These are the issues that I shall cover in further entries, hoping to gain more insight and to understand past works in more detail so as to be able to make fewer rash claims. Read on soon.

Note: personhood was chosen as the word in the first paragraph as the thought experiments issue lies with the problem of what makes me me. Is it my body which contains my genes, or is it my soul, or perhaps both must be there for me to truly be me. Hence personhood seemed to be the correct word, as to choose who is the real me we must examine what defines me as me, the thinking human being I am.